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Worldwide, infectious diseases continue to emerge at an
alarming pace, due to numerous factors including micro-
bial adaptation, increasing human population migration,
urbanization, conflict and instability, intensified
animal-human interface, and habitat perturbation [1–6].
The litmus test for an effective national public health
program is its ability to be ready to initiate an effective
response for an unknown emerging or re-emerging in-
fectious disease or public health event. The most im-
pactful global health programs are built with the
understanding that they must be able to help countries
strengthen core public health capacity so that new
threats can be detected and contained before they be-
come international crises that increase morbidity and
mortality, adversely impact the health and livelihoods of
individuals and populations, disrupt travel, interfere with
global trade and economies, or even lead to political
destabilization [6, 7].
This is the basis for all global health security work and
has been the mission of CDC’s Global Disease Detection
(GDD) program since its inception in 2004. As one of
the first steps through which CDC systematically
approached global health security, the GDD program
was designed to bring resources together to promote a
broader approach to preparing countries for any infec-
tious disease threat that could occur [8]. Today, after
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most urgent public health threats, lessons from the
GDD program as a precursor to global health security
offer the global health community one model for collect-
ive success. This supplement is dedicated to highlighting
a sample of successes achieved and lessons learned
through the GDD program throughout its 10+ years of
implementation.Beginnings and principles
The idea for the GDD program took shape against the
backdrop of the 2002–2003 severe acute respiratory syn-
drome (SARS) epidemic, which affected more than 8000
people in 29 countries and cost the world more than
$40 billion US dollars [9, 10]. In 2004, the U.S. Congress
authorized funding for CDC to establish the GDD pro-
gram [8]. Using existing research infrastructure devel-
oped as part of CDC’s International Emerging Infectious
Diseases Program, the GDD program was developed to
“promote global health security by building capacity to
rapidly detect and contain emerging health threats [8,
11, 12]. Since its inception, the GDD program has held a
broader more cross -cutting mandate than previous
CDC programs. Rather than focusing on a single disease
or issue, the GDD program helps prepare countries for
any emerging or reemerging infectious disease outbreak
or significant public health event.
To fulfill its mission, the GDD program uniquely
established a network of Regional Centers (GDD RCs) to
help countries rapidly and effectively address public
health threats. These international centers formed a
worldwide base of health security through scientific
evidence-based capacity building and creating strong,
trusted ties with partner countries (Fig. 1).le is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
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Fig. 1 Timeline of the Evolution of the Global Disease Detection Program
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velop a strong workforce of epidemiologists and
laboratorians; enhance or promote the One Health
concept [13] by encouraging multi-sectoral collabora-
tions between Ministries of Health and Ministries of
Agriculture; and build and expand state-of-the-art la-
boratory capacity for detection of newly emerging in-
fectious diseases in addition to strengthening basic
laboratory diagnostic capabilities. To date, GDD RCs
have provided expert consultations, supported out-
break response, and offered epidemiology and labora-
tory training in more than 103 countries.
Ten GDD RCs existed (Fig. 2) as of January 2018,
representing the Americas, Africa, and Asia – including
the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia. Selection of
countries for placement of GDD RCs was based on a
number of factors, including: 1) country interest in host-
ing a GDD RC, including track-record of previous suc-
cessful collaborations with US government agencies 2)
high burden or perceived high burden of infectious dis-
eases in the country or region, 3) potential for infectious
disease emergence, and 4) a need to strengthen orFig. 2 Map of GDD Regional Centers (GDD RCs) and outbreak support pro
GDD RC that provided support, while size corresponds to the number of o
the home country of each GDD RC were not included in this mapimprove public health infrastructure to detect and re-
spond to infectious disease outbreaks.
An early insight was that the baseline public health in-
frastructure varied from country to country. At a mini-
mum, all were in need of workforce development (i.e.
trained field epidemiologists, public health laboratorians,
data analysts and health communicators), improvements
in the ability to develop complex laboratory diagnostics,
and creation or improvement of disease surveillance, in-
cluding specimen transport systems and integration of
laboratory and surveillance data into an adequate re-
sponse system [12]. To meet this variety of needs, CDC
placed experienced medical epidemiologists, laborator-
ians, veterinarians, and public health specialists in a
number of the GDD RCs [12].
The work of the GDD RCs has been guided by two
overarching objectives or principles: 1) to conduct cut-
ting edge public health science, including original re-
search, and to generate solid data to inform public
health policy decisions, and help guide public health
capacity building, and 2) to have forward-deployed as-
sets or pre-positioned staff, equipment and supplies tovided by the GDD RCs from 2007 to 2016. Color corresponds to the
utbreaks supported in each country. Note: Outbreaks responded to in
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respond to outbreaks and prevent further spread of dis-
ease within and outside the borders of the country.
GDD and Global Health security
Global health preparedness is a priority worldwide, as
evidenced by the adoption of the International Health
Regulations (IHR) in 2005, and the subsequent work of
over 60 nations, the U.S. Government, CDC, the World
Health Organization (WHO), to advance the Global
Health Security Agenda (GHSA) [14]. GHSA, launched
in February 2014, is a commitment between countries to
marshal resources, expertise, and technical assistance to
build core public health infrastructure around the world
and monitor progress using specific metrics and targets.
The ultimate goal of the GHSA is to better prepare for
epidemics and pandemics and to help countries meet
their commitments to the WHO IHR, 2005 [15] and the
World Organization of Animal Health’s (OIE) Perform-
ance of Veterinary Services Pathway [16]. The GDD pro-
gram’s value in helping countries achieve IHR goals was
solidified in December 2009, when the program – al-
though a relatively small program with a modest budget
– was designated by WHO as a Collaborating Center for
Implementation of IHR National Surveillance and Re-
sponse Capacity [17].
The GDD program contributes to global health secur-
ity efforts in much the same way as GHSA by strength-
ening the world’s core public health capacity, ultimately
helping countries achieve IHR compliance. The program
serves the countries in which it resides, as well as neigh-
boring countries, with the expertise and support needed
to prevent, detect, and respond to any public health
threat.
A look at the data: GDD program activities and
accomplishments
The GDD program has collected data for both quantita-
tive and qualitative indicators to monitor and evaluate
the progress and effectiveness of its regional centers
since 2006, with some additional indicators added in
2007 and 2017. These indicators cover multiple topic
areas including consultations, outbreak investigations,
trainings and workforce development, pathogen discov-
ery, new diagnostic testing capacity, surveillance, net-
working, and publications.
Data associated with each GDD RC capture both ef-
forts and outcomes in country and support to other
nations. Additional CDC datasets with information on
human assets deployed during the Ebola epidemic
and data sharing during the Zika epidemic were also
included in these analyses. The three datasets (GDD
program indicators [2006–2016], Ebola, and Zika)
were analyzed using Tableau Software, version 10.3.2.Findings were validated with targeted outreach to
CDC personnel.
Outbreak response
From 2006 to 2016, GDD RCs responded to 2051 out-
breaks around the world. Each outbreak response corre-
sponded to a specific event regardless of the number of
cases identified during the outbreak – for example, a
single case of rabies and an outbreak of dengue resulting
in 8000 cases were both considered single outbreak
events. Outbreaks also included events in animals, such
as H5N1 in poultry, West Nile Virus in horses, and ra-
bies in dogs, as well as responses related to the environ-
ment such as pesticide poisonings and natural disasters.
One quarter (509 of 2051) of all outbreaks that GDD
RCs responded to between 2006 and 2016 occurred out-
side of the GDD RCs’ countries of origin (Fig. 2).
Among one of the most important contributions of
the GDD RCs have been responses during the recent
WHO-declared Public Health Events of International
Concern (PHEICs). Shortly after the April 2009 declar-
ation of H1N1 as a PHEIC, GDD RCs in Egypt,
Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Kenya, and Thailand partnered
with 57 countries to improve and/or establish diagnostic
laboratory capacity to detect H1N1 (Fig. 3); 46 of these
(80%) partnerships or interactions occurred from May
1–June 1, 2009.
During the 2014–2015 Ebola outbreak in West Africa,
all 10 GDD RCs, as well as CDC Headquarters in At-
lanta, deployed GDD program personnel to aid in the
response effort (Fig. 4). In total, 45 individuals associated
and stationed within the GDD RCs were among the first
responders to be deployed; 37 of these individuals de-
ployed to Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone, while others
deployed to the Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau,
DRC, Nigeria, Benin, and Switzerland. In addition, 13 of
the 45 (29%) individuals deployed were host country na-
tionals or locally employed staff.
GDD RCs not only directly supported Ebola response
efforts but also prepared their respective and neighbor-
ing countries for possible importation and spread of the
virus within their borders. Using an assessment tool de-
veloped by CDC, GDD Guatemala conducted an Ebola
preparedness assessment for 12 Latin American nations,
while GDD Egypt trained 13 participants from Jordan,
Morocco, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Egypt on Ebola pre-
paredness. GDD Bangladesh collaborated with a large
number of non-governmental private sector groups to
develop standard operating procedures for Ebola case
management and response; similarly, GDD Thailand col-
laborated with health ministers from 13 countries to de-
velop a strategic framework for enhancing partnership
on Ebola preparedness and response. Laboratory testing
capacity for Ebola was increased by GDD India, and
Fig. 3 Map of 57 countries that gained laboratory testing capacity to detect H1N1 during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, in partnership with Regional
Centers. Color corresponds to the RC that supported H1N1 laboratory capacity building. Note: Map does not include countries that had existing
capacity to detect H1N1. RCs in India (2009), South Africa (2010), Bangladesh (2011), and Georgia (2013) were established during or after 2009
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proved by GDD Kenya. Meanwhile, GDD RCs in South
Africa and China focused on increasing communication
platforms for the dissemination of information concern-
ing Ebola. Furthermore, the Chinese Field Epidemiology
Training Program (FETP) deployed 23 current and
former trainees for the first time and U.S. CDC locally
engaged country staff were deployed to Sierra Leone to
help transfer laboratory technology to the Chinese la-
boratory in-country.
The GDD RCs were well poised to act during the
2014–2017 Zika epidemic. Using a combination of fund-
ing sources, including Zika supplemental funding pro-
vided through partnership with the US Agency for
International Development and GDD core funding, eight
of the 10 GDD RCs (Guatemala, Kenya, Thailand, SouthFig. 4 Map showing the deployment of 45 Regional Center staff to countr
Centers around the world and from CDC’s headquarters in Atlanta, GA in r
multiple deploymentsAfrica, India, Bangladesh, China, and Egypt) were able
to use their existing acute febrile illness surveillance sys-
tems to implement a global, network-wide surveillance
activity to examine the global distribution of Zika virus.
The timely introduction of Zika testing into existing
GDD supported surveillance platforms allowed for the
rapid identification and characterization of some of the
first Zika cases in Guatemala and India [18]. The
Guatemala, Kenya, and Thailand RCs were also able to
quickly design and implement studies to examine the ef-
fect of Zika virus infection in pregnant women and their
babies, and the Guatemala RC was able to initiate activ-
ities to examine potential long-term outcomes of infec-
tion. Leveraging existing platforms allowed for faster
implementation of activities. It also generated important
lessons for future responses, such as the need toies in West Africa and Geneva, Switzerland from CDC’s 10 Regional
esponse to the 2014 Ebola epidemic. Note: Map does not include
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comparability of results across countries, and highlighted
the potential benefits of centralized coordination of sur-
veillance and research.Laboratory capacity
One of the strengths of the GDD RCs has been their
ability to increase laboratory capacity for identification
of threats, including identifying new pathogens to the
world or pathogens new to a region.
Of the 2051 outbreak responses, the GDD RCs pro-
vided laboratory support in 1363 (66%). Of these 1363
laboratory-supported outbreak responses, 1153 (85%) re-
sulted in a confirmed etiology or cause of the outbreak.
In the same 10-year period, 381 pathogen-specific tests
were newly established or updated by GDD RCs in 62
countries through a program of deliberate technology
transfer. Examples included tests for pathogens of inter-
national concern or pandemic potential (e.g. H1N1,
H5N1, H7N9, MERS coronavirus, chikungunya, and
Ebola), respiratory pathogens (e.g. adenovirus, rhino-
virus, coronavirus, and RSV), acute febrile illness patho-
gens (e.g. Q Fever/Coxiella burnetii, Leptospirosis,
Brucella, Rickettsia, and West Nile Virus), food and
waterborne pathogens (e.g. Escherichia coli, Salmonella,
Shigella, Listeria, and Campylobacter), and others (e.g.
Bartonella species, Botulinum neurotoxins, arboviruses,
arenaviruses).
In collaboration with local and international part-
ners, GDD RCs conducted groundbreaking work on
79 organisms during 2007–2016, including detecting
62 organisms new to their respective regions, discov-
ering 11 organisms and pathogens new to the world,
and identifying 5 pathogens with a new mode of
transmission (Table 1). Examples of pathogens new to
their respective regions included novel influenza vi-
ruses (H1N1, H5N1, H3N2, H9N2), arboviruses (den-
gue serotype 3, Chikungunya virus, Zika virus, West
Nile virus, Tahyna virus, Babanki virus, Ndumu virus,
Sindbis-like virus, Usutu virus, Sandfly fever Sicilian
virus) [19, 20], and bacterial and parasitic pathogens
(Q fever/Coxiella burnetii, Leishmania species, and
Legionella longbeacheae) [21].Table 1 Table of newly discovered organisms by GDD Regional
Centers from 2006 to 2016, categorized by nature of detection
Total New Pathogens Detected/Discovered 79
New to the World (Organism) 5
New to the World (Pathogen) 6
New Mode of Transmission 6
New to the Region 62Surveillance, epidemiology, and data capacity
In 2017, the GDD program began collecting data on the
number and type of surveillance platforms and the num-
ber of people enrolled or captured in active or passive
disease surveillance systems. GDD RCs’ activities cur-
rently cover more than 109,000,000 people through vari-
ous types of surveillance platforms. GDD RCs have
established more than 288 unique surveillance sites
monitoring disease syndromes and specific illnesses such
as acute febrile illness, respiratory disease, Japanese En-
cephalitis, and Nipah Virus. The syndrome most com-
monly responded to by GDD RCs from 2007 to 2016
was gastrointestinal illness (diarrhea, vomiting), followed
by influenza-like illness (ILI) and acute/undifferentiated
febrile illness (A/UFI). Increased ILI cases in 2009 were
due to the pandemic of H1N1 and outbreaks of H5N1,
while increased gastrointestinal illnesses in 2013 corre-
sponded to cases of cholera in Kenya, and increased A/
UFI in 2014 correlated with the dengue and chikun-
gunya outbreaks in East Africa.
The types of disease surveillance platforms imple-
mented via the GDD RCs include event-based, sentinel,
facility-based, and population-based surveillance. The
ability to conduct population-based surveillance is par-
ticularly important because it often provides the most
accurate information on the burden of infectious disease
syndromes, as it allows for the calculation of their inci-
dence, which is the number of cases among a known
population size during a standard period of time. GDD
RCs in China, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Kenya and
Thailand have conducted population-based surveillance
over the course of the 10-year period [22–27]. The inci-
dence rates generated via these platforms are important
measures of disease burden because they can be com-
pared across different locales. Examples of uses of data
derived from population-based surveillance include the
comparison of rates of disease in rural areas with rates
in urban areas and the monitoring of impact of interven-
tions or control strategies.
Workforce development
The GDD program recognizes that a strong workforce
lies at the core of effective emergency response. From
2006 to 2016, the GDD RCs trained more than 115,000
multi-disciplinary public health professionals through
3399 unique training sessions. The subject matter ex-
perts from across CDC headquarters, as well as highly
trained medical epidemiologists, laboratorians, veterinar-
ians, and public health specialists stationed within the
GDD RCs lead formal training programs, such as the
Field Epidemiology Training Program (FETP), offer in-
formal on-the-job-training and provide mentorship to
local counterparts [28]. In addition to leading training
opportunities such as tabletop exercises and data
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matter expertise around the agency to provide
disease-specific guidance and training. This development
of workforce capacity at the local level is integral to
identifying and containing public health threats at their
source.
The graduates of FETPs in GDD RCs from 2006 to
2016 responded to many of the outbreaks recorded,
leading to proper identification of the source for many
of the outbreaks, detection of additional cases/determin-
ing the full scope of the outbreaks, and classification or
discovery of existing or novel risk factors of disease
transmission. More often than not, these graduates con-
tinue to practice public health in-country after graduat-
ing [28].
Research and support
GDD RCs served as the platform for subject matter ex-
perts and researchers across CDC and through their ef-
fort provided a total of 4253 public health consultations
from 2006 to 2016. Consultations varied widely in scope,
type of collaborators, and length of partnership. For ex-
ample, GDD Kenya regularly provided consultations on
health issues affecting refugees in Kenya, Ethiopia,
Uganda, and Tanzania, while GDD India teamed up with
the National Institute of Mental Health and Allied Sci-
ences (NIMHANS) to work on an acute encephalitis
syndrome network. Regional Centers such as GDD
Egypt, GDD Kazakhstan, and GDD Georgia conducted
laboratory assessments at laboratories and hospitals, rec-
ommended laboratory equipment for national blood
banks, and advised on infection control procedures, re-
spectively, with subject matter expertise support from
CDC headquarters.
Furthermore, the GDD RCs supported the use of tech-
nology by collaborating with provincial satellite TV
channels to communicate risks such as hand, foot, and
mouth disease (HFMD) and H1N1 in Vietnam – as was
the case with GDD China – and by providing technical
support for an electronic surveillance platform in
Panama, coordinated out of the GDD RC in Guatemala.
Finally, GDD RCs worked with a number of collabora-
tors (i.e., GDD South Africa with National Park staff,
GDD Bangladesh with live-bird market workers, and
GDD Thailand with veterinarians) on a variety of One
Health projects.
The GDD program collaborates with experts across
CDC, maximizing the subject matter expertise residing
in the agency, and with ministries of health and inter-
national partners. From 2006 to 2016, GDD RC staff
authored or co-authored a total of 877 peer-reviewed ar-
ticles and 1416 other significant documents, such as pol-
icy documents, position papers, and training manuals.
These publications address disease-specific outbreaksand emergencies, surveillance and laboratory science,
and cross-cutting priorities related to disease threats.
These publications show the diversity and strong scien-
tific foundations of GDD’s work.Discussion and lessons learned
The original overarching goal and purpose of the GDD
program was to improve global capacity within partner
nations to prevent emerging infectious disease threats at
the site of origin, rapidly detect disease events, and re-
spond to outbreaks to mitigate the consequences to the
population. The accomplishments of the GDD RCs high-
light examples of many firsts: diseases detected before
they became significant threats; additions of new labora-
tory tests to identify the cause of illness; vital workforce
training programs begun and expanded; as well as faster,
smarter response to outbreaks because of the capacity
the program helped build in-country.
As previously noted, the GDD program offered an
early strategic approach to global health security efforts
as countries worked to meet their obligations under the
IHR [15]. When the IHR [15] were adopted in 2005, the
GDD program was uniquely positioned to help close the
critical gap between global public heath capacities de-
fined in the IHR [15] and the ability of many member
states to meet these requirements. Over a decade after
implementation of the IHR [15] more than 60 countries
have extended their commitment to strengthening global
public health capacity through the GHSA [14]. The
GDD program again offered a framework for – and ex-
perience in – implementing the cross-cutting public
health systems needed to meet the targets set forth by
both IHR and GHSA.
The GDD program exemplifies the work that CDC has
done to improve global health outcomes and enhance
global health security specifically as part of the core
functions of the organization. The GDD program unites
the resources of the United States and its international
partners to provide technical assistance, logistical sup-
port, and funding through regional networks and inter-
governmental organizations. Through this work, we
have increased the capacity of the global public health
workforce to identify and contain threats.
It is critical to note that the value of the in-country
work done by the GDD program extends beyond stop-
ping outbreaks. Partnerships and relationships formed
through the program have contributed to health diplo-
macy abroad. These critical ties extend our ability to re-
spond in times of crisis, and play an additional role in
strengthening other initiatives and programs that protect
public health. Public health programs like GDD have
served as inroads to connection in fragile areas, such as
those facing political instability and conflict, because
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versally acknowledged health needs.
One tested model for the future of global health security
The GDD program’s efforts over the last decade to im-
prove global public health capacity have, indeed, moved
us forward. Measurable progress has been made within a
focused, but limited, scope. For progress to continue,
however, CDC and the global health community must
go beyond our initial efforts and work more broadly to
confront challenges and embrace opportunities that
arise. The GDD program has given us the following im-
portant lessons that can inform our next steps:
1) Create multiregional connectivity. Strong networks
can harness a variety of strengths, share resources,
and connect across disciplines toward common
goals. A major success of the GDD program has
been to create regional platforms where subject
matter experts can engage with one another and
programs can break free of their silos. Moving from
siloed to shared approaches also enhances
collaboration on science and research, thereby
strengthening the foundation for public health
action. Global networks have been created by GDD,
and more recently with GHSA, in recognition that
shared risk means shared responsibility, and the
best way to achieve success is by working together
to ensure our collective health, safety, and security.
2) Adopt consistent goals and measures. From the
beginning, the GDD program has applied a
consistent set of goals and metrics to track progress
over time and across programs. The world’s global
health security efforts are also seeing the benefits of
instituting consistent targets, as well as frameworks
for measuring success against those targets. Over
the past few years, the WHO Joint External
Evaluations have become a valuable tool to track
progress on global health security initiatives, both
past-to-present and country-to-country [29]. Evalu-
ation is a key part of recognizing accomplishments
and is critical to finding gaps we must still address.
Only once we know where we stand can we take ac-
tion to implement successful programs and point
them in the right direction to reduce our identified
vulnerabilities.
3) Deploy the power of science and data. Cutting-edge
scientific research has always been at the core of
the GDD program’s mission. Scientific data are the
tool we use to detect, respond, and to halt or pre-
vent outbreaks and to inform policy changes that
protect public health globally. Scientific research
helps partners make evidence-based decisions and
implement effective local solutions that eliminateoutbreaks at their source. Additionally, taking an
active role in teaching others how to capture,
analyze, and effectively use public health data cre-
ates a workforce capable of rapidly recognizing and
responding to threats. Future scientific progress will
require not only improved connection across scien-
tific disciplines, but also sustained and dedicated
commitment to a unified scientific strategy.
4) Build trusted partnerships. The GDD program’s
success has relied on strong partnerships. The
program’s longstanding presence in regions across
the globe has proven that in-country engagement
leads to trust. This trust becomes particularly valu-
able in outbreak response, as global partners rely on
CDC data and expertise as a resource that saves
lives. Strong partnerships at all levels are critical to
global health security, and the process of creating
GDD RCs has formed and strengthened partner-
ships at all levels – government-to-government re-
lationships, collaboration with other organizations
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and
local and personal connections – that can be lever-
aged to address critical public health priorities.
5) Build for flexibility. Cross-cutting public health pro-
grams give us the ability to respond to any crisis,
regardless of cause. Strong core systems and con-
nected resources can pivot when needed to address
emerging or reemerging threats. As threats change,
and as science changes, funding tied to a single dis-
ease may prove limiting in its scope. Conversely, in-
vestment in core public health capacity ensures that
a single mission does not dictate the longevity or
capacity of a program, and that we can continue to
maintain and grow our valuable resources, expert-
ise, and connections. Flexible, nimble systems are
our best answer to an unpredictable future.
Ongoing challenges
While there have been many successes and substantial
impacts made by GDD RCs, there have also been sig-
nificant challenges recognized. Some of these have
impacted the ability of the GDD program to accom-
plish one of its primary goals: helping countries
achieve IHR compliance.
Despite the global prominence of infectious diseases,
there are few rigorous and precise estimates of the bur-
den and etiology of key infectious disease syndromes in
developing countries [30, 31]. Some of the problems in
measuring the burden of these diseases in developing
countries have included poor access to the clinical facil-
ities, lack of accurate or available laboratory diagnostics,
and absence of population-based surveillance systems
needed to accurately assess incidence rates. Accurate in-
formation on burden of the most important infectious
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public health policy decision-makers to set current pri-
orities for optimal use of limited resources for public
health programs. Efforts to assist our partner countries
in building national laboratory and surveillance systems
have been significantly hampered by insufficient re-
source allocation – both financial and staff time. This
has led to a greater recognition of the actual time and
money required to develop and maintain such systems.
Another challenge has been the need for better coord-
ination and communication of a unified mission and ob-
jective that is supported, fully adopted and implemented
in all of the GDD RCs. In some instances, lack of clarity
on adopting and implementing a unified mission led to a
divergence of operations and a mixture of activities
driven, in many cases, by individual investigator interests
and expertise in country. The inability to have every
kind of public health expertise represented among
country-based staff highlights the need for sustained and
active scientific engagement across the agency. The pub-
lic health science conducted through such activities has
been commendable; however, the data generated has not
always been completely successful in informing policy
for ministries of health (i.e., vaccine coverage, educa-
tional campaigns targeting high-risk populations, im-
provement or development of vector-control programs).
More needs to be done to ensure that data are applied
to their full potential in improving the health of the pop-
ulations served.
Finally, although there have been some cross GDD RC
projects (e.g., Use of a multipathogen Taqman Array
Card to identify the etiology of community-acquired
pneumonia, C. Van Beneden pers com), overall, it has
been a challenge for the GDD RCs to link across a net-
work of regional offices or platforms to implement uni-
fied protocols or projects (i.e. estimating burden of a
specific disease, measuring the effect of a specific med-
ical countermeasure, etc.) in multiple countries,
throughout multiple populations, in diverse ecologies,
and among unique cultural settings. Building the cap-
acity to do this could strengthen the overall goals of glo-
bal health security to prevent, detect and respond to
health threats.
Conclusion
The GDD program is part of a long and significant his-
tory at CDC of protecting health globally, ranging from
smallpox eradication, polio elimination, HIV, malaria,
and cholera control to emergencies including SARS,
H1N1, Ebola, and Zika. As this history shows us, global
health is never static, and the work is not finished.
As we look to the future, our biggest challenge re-
mains the unknown. Health threats will continue to take
us by surprise. The nature of disease means that wecannot always predict what the next outbreak will be, or
where and how it will spread. Ever-increasing intercon-
nection across the globe means that when the next out-
break does take hold, it will be capable of spreading
rapidly. To stop it, we will need systems in place that are
sensitive enough to signal a new health threat, specific
enough to pinpoint problems and focus resources, and
flexible and connected enough to protect the world’s
economic and social wellbeing. We must recognize that
global health security begins locally – if there are gaps
anywhere in the system, disease will find it.
Lessons learned through the lens of the GDD program
can offer us a way forward. More than a decade of suc-
cesses and failures has given us information and
evidence-based strategies essential to developing core
public health capacities around the world. These strat-
egies include increasing coordinated, multi-center scien-
tific collaboration across nations to strengthen the global
network; increasing the number of public health profes-
sionals trained; broadening and strengthening global
partnerships; and reducing gaps in global preparedness
for emerging health threats.
As the global health community looks for the best
ways to operate in our changing world, lessons from the
GDD program will continue to inform our work. We
have an obligation to keep our nation and our world
safe, healthy, and secure. We must therefore continue
our efforts — and commit to doing much more — to
improve what we can, where we can, on a continual
basis. We can afford nothing less.
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